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Abstract 
 
People with invisible and variable impairments and disabilities (or PWIVID) represent a 
significant subset of people with disabilities (PWD). This paper calls on those within the 
Critical Disability Studies (CDS) ‘silo’ and other disability fora to deploy the tradition of 
intracategorical intersectional analysis to address our internal “hierarchy, hegemony, and 
exclusivity” (Nash, 2008, p. 2) and “account for lived experience at neglected points of 
intersection” (McCall, 2005) regarding PWIVID. The PWIVID acronym – introduced in this 
paper as the counterpart to the seldom-acknowledged default PWD represented by those 
I term here PWOSID (people with obvious and stable impairments and disabilities) – 
helps highlight issues unequally represented in historical, political and theoretical 
accounts of disablement pertaining to non-apparent and unpredictable impairments – 
including disability identity and what Garland-Thomson (2014) calls “body management.” 
CDS and disability communities are invited to challenge the unexamined presumptions of 
McCall (2005) and other intersectional theorists that “mixed locations” are, on all bases, 
more akin to “dominant” (or “privileged”) ones than those seen as explicitly “subordinate” 
(or “burdened”) – at least when it comes to lived experiences of dis/ability – and to better 
recognise and reflect PWIVID’s unique voices and concerns.  
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L’intersectionnalité, est-elle une approche avantageuse pour 
l’analyse de l’incapacité?  
Nous présentons le «PWIVID»: l’invisibilité et la variabilité 
comme interventions intra-catégoriques 
 
  
 Résumé 
 
Les personnes ayant des incapacités et handicaps invisibles et périodiques (ou 
«PWIVID») représentent une minorité importante parmi les personnes en situation de 
handicap («PWD»). Cet article est un appel à ceux et celles qui se trouvent dans le ‘silo’ 
des études critiques sur l’incapacité («CDS»), et d’autres forums d’études sur l’incapacité, 
pour tenter une analyse intersectionnelle et intra-catégorique afin d’adresser les 
hégémonies, hiérarchies, et exclusivités internes à ces champs d’étude (Nash, 2008, p. 
2), et pour tenir compte des réalités vécues des relations intersectionnelles (McCall, 
2005) négligées. L’ acronyme «PWIVID»  est présenté comme alternative au «PWOSID» 
– celui-ci rappelle les expériences des personnes ayant des incapacités évidentes et 
constantes, qui font le plus souvent l’objet des études sur l’incapacité. Ceci nous aide à 
mettre l’accent sur des questions souvent sous-représentées dans les récits historiques, 
politiques, et théorétiques qui portent sur les incapacités invisibles et périodiques  – ce 
qui comprend aussi l’identité du handicap et ce que Garland-Thomson (2014) nomme, «la 
gestation du corps». Cet article invite les études critiques sur l’incapacité et les 
communautés de personnes en situation de handicap à contester les pésuppositions non-
examinées de McCall  (2005) et d’autres théoristes e l’intersectionnalité qui affirment que 
les “positions mixtes” sont plus semblables aux positions dominantes ou privilégiés que 
celles qui sont explicitement subordonnées (ou chargé) - du moins lorsque ça vient aux 
expériences vécues du handicap – et pour mieux reconnaître et refléter les voix et 
préoccupations uniques des «PWIVID». 
 
 
Mots clés 
 
Déficiences invisibles; déficiences variables; déficiences épisodiques; conditions 
épisodiques; l’intersectionnalité; maladies chroniques; complexité intracatégorique. 
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Is Intersectionality A Disabled Framework? 
Presenting PWIVID: In/Visibility and Variability as Intracategorical Interventions 
 
As a response to the lengthy history of essentialism and exclusion that has plagued 
both feminist and anti-racist scholarship, the intersectional project centres the 
experiences of subjects whose voices have been ignored. (Jennifer Nash, 2008, p.3) 
  
In recent decades, disability in the West has been “increasingly understood in terms of 
oppression and inequality” (Beauchamp-Pryor, 2011, p. 6). This paper1 calls on those 
within the Critical Disability Studies (CDS) ‘silo’ and other disability fora to draw upon 
the tradition of intersectional analysis to address our internal “hierarchy, hegemony, and 
exclusivity” (Nash, 2008, p. 2). In particular, I draw attention to those whom I categorise 
as ‘people with invisible and variable impairments and disabilities’ (PWIVID)2. PWIVID 
constitute a subset of ‘people with impairments and disabilities’ (PWID) – most often 
referred to simply as people with disabilities (PWD) 3. Calling attention to experiences of 
impairment not equally represented in historical, political and theoretical accounts of 
disablement, I ask how CDS and disability ‘communities’ might move forward to 
recognise and reclaim the voices of PWIVID. Utilising my own observations4, along with 
                     
1
 I am indebted to several reviewers (known and anonymous) for their comments on pre-publication 
versions of this paper, whose requests for clarification on key points – including my rationale for creating 
the PWIVID acronym – forced me to interrogate the reasons for some of my choices herein. This final 
version is much stronger for their questions and suggestions, for which I am grateful. 
 
2
 I opted to mobilise the terminology of “variable disabilities” as an alternative to the most analogous term 
in the literature (“episodic disabilities”) – which (as an anonymous reviewer observed) has a similar 
meaning, as well as a growing body of literature associated with it – in order to capture and emphasize, 
(as this same reviewer noted), that fluctuations in the presence and degree of non-stable impairments are 
often not a binary proposition, as the term “episodic” might imply.  
 
3
 For the sake of a common reference point for the general category of disabled people, I use the more 
customary PWD rather than PWID throughout this essay. However, given that impairment is a 
prerequisite of disability (e.g., see Souza, February 3, 2014) often overlooked within social-model-inspired 
disability circles, I see some utility in moving towards the adoption of PWID over PWD (not to mention its 
potential for monosyllabic pronouncement). That said, I am hesitant to move PWD in the LGBTQ+ 
direction of ever-expanding and increasingly specific initialisms – the latter of which have been clawed 
back with ‘umbrella’ terms (e.g., queer) and/or shorter short-forms (e.g., Diverse Sexuality and Gender 
(DSG) – see http://www.asexuality.org/en/topic/106135-a-new-acronym-dsg-vs-lgbtqia/).  
 
4
 As Mia Mingus (2010, February 25) notes, “If you have privilege, you can never be neutral, because you 
are constantly benefiting off of that privilege—even at the same time as you are also being oppressed. 
That is what “intersectionality” (for lack of a better word) is about.” Along these lines, my theorisation of 
and identification with the PWIVID concept coexist with and are informed by my (visible and invisible) 
experiences of both of privilege (e.g., my nationality, whiteness – as defined in my current context, access 
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those of other PWIVID whose inclusion under the disability umbrella has been 
problematised (e.g., see Souza, 2014, February 3), I aim to “account for lived 
experience at neglected points of intersection” (McCall, 2005). I also challenge the 
unexamined presumption of McCall and other intersectional theorists that “mixed 
locations” are, on all bases, more akin to “dominant” (or “privileged”) ones than those 
seen as explicitly “subordinate” (or “burdened”) – at least when it comes to lived 
experiences of dis/ability. Piecing together a variety of sources, academic and popular, I 
utilise my PWIVID-specific “direct experience of the everyday world” as a “primary 
ground” of knowledge in what Dorothy Smith has called an alternative approach (1974, 
p. 11; 1990). Thus, I aim to highlight intracategorical issues in non-inclusive and non-
representative disability milieus and interrogate the common “assumption that [we’re all] 
‘on the same side’” (Morris, 1993, p. 56). 
 
Re-’Re-Thinking Intersectionality’ 
The problem with identity politics is not that it fails to transcend difference, as some 
critics charge, but rather the opposite – that it frequently conflates or ignores intragroup 
differences… [I]gnoring differences within groups contributes to tension among groups. 
(Kimberlé Crenshaw, 1994)  
 
In her critical article “Re-thinking Intersectionality,” Jennifer C. Nash (2008) asserts that: 
Intersectionality, the notion that subjectivity is constituted by mutually 
reinforcing vectors of race, gender, class, and sexuality, has emerged as the 
primary theoretical tool designed to combat feminist hierarchy, hegemony, 
and exclusivity[, becoming] the ‘gold standard’ multi-disciplinary approach for 
analysing subjects’ experiences of both identity and oppression. (p. 2) 
 
Nash attributes the emergence of the term intersectionality to late 1980s critical race 
studies: “a scholarly movement born in the legal academy committed to problematizing 
law’s purported colour-blindness, neutrality, and objectivity” (p. 13). She particularly 
credits legal scholar Kimberlé Crenshaw’s seminal articulation of intersectionality as 
having “galvanized an array of disciplines to consider questions of essentialism, 
                                                                  
to education, etc.) and marginalization (e.g., my queerness, the intergenerational trauma related to and 
direct effects of my being parented by a war-orphaned, international adoptee whose nuclear family was 
murdered in an ethnic genocide, etc.).   
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exclusion, and complex identity in new ways.”  But how does dis/ability fit into this 
problematic? 
CDS could arguably be included amongst the array of “galvanized” disciplines to 
which Nash alludes in the quote above; however, her piece itself notably makes but a 
tokenistic mention of “able-bodiedness”5 (p. 10). Historically, then, it seems important to 
recall that the initial proliferation of ‘intersectional’ theories and methodologies 
happened partly as a critical response to (presumably well-intentioned) white feminists’ 
neglect of other feminists’ perspectives. As Brooks & Hesse-Biber (2007, p. 6). note, 
“the failure of academic scholarship and mainstream research to ‘give voice’ to women’s 
activities, experiences, and perspectives provoked early feminist scholars and 
researchers to seek remedies for these omissions.” In other words, it was those 
(specifically underrepresented racialised women) whose voices were not solicited or 
heard (adequately or often enough) who, upon being subjected to so many ostensibly 
inclusive narratives lacking standpoints resonant with their own, intervened with 
intersectional approaches.  
In this light, Nash’s (p. 3) critique of feminism’s “perennial inattention to racial, 
ethnic, class, and sexual difference(s)” begs to be turned back upon itself – and towards 
us – to inspire some pointed questions:  
 How might we, as disabled and disability-aware scholars, address the 
“perennial” tendency of some of the most intersectional anti-oppressive theories 
(and theorists) to routinely ignore disability in their substantive analyses?  
                     
5
 This ‘tokenistic mention’ is a passing reference to Zack’s (2005, p. 7) allusion to “physical ableness” and 
“able-bodiedness” among possible categories of marginalisation and privilege that could be considered 
through an intersectional lens, as per: Zack, N. (2005) Inclusive Feminism: A Third Wave Theory of 
Women’s Commonality, Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc. 
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 How far has intersectionality moved from its origins in critical race legal theory 
to truly being “the ‘gold standard’ multi-disciplinary approach for analysing 
subjects’ experiences of both identity and oppression”? Has ‘intersectional theory’ 
sufficiently extended beyond its initial “vectors of race, gender, class, and 
sexuality” (Nash, p. 2) to include other ‘multiply marginalised’ people (such as 
multiply marginalised PWD)?  
 Has intersectionality, in practice, “become a useful tool for CDS [that] 
contribute[s] to in fact overcoming much of the marginalisation and discrimination 
of disabled people” (Meekosha & Shuttleworth, 2009, p. 62)? When the PWD 
category is included in intersectional analyses, and in CDS more generally, which 
PWD experiences are, by default, still excluded? 
 
‘Cripping’ Intersectionality 
The body that causes… discomfort (by not fulfilling an expectation of whiteness) is the 
one who must work hard to make others comfortable. You have to pass by passing… by 
minimizing the signs of difference… [D]iversity work becomes willful work when we are 
willing to be the cause of disturbance. Perhaps we can only do this work, this work of 
agreeing to stand out and stand apart, this disturbing work, when we work with others. 
(Sara Ahmed, September 14, 2014) 
 
Theoretically, a re-centring of dis/ability in ‘intersectional’ interdisciplinary conversations 
is more than just imaginable; as some (e.g., Piepmeier, Cantrell, & Maggio, 2014) have 
argued, it is already a project well under way.  That said, one need not be too removed 
from intersectionality’s U.S-based critical race theory origins to notice the extent to 
which the specifically (presumably able-bodied) paradigmatic African American 
woman’s experiences constitute not only its epistemological foundation but also inform 
many subsequent developments and dialogues in the practice and rhetoric of 
intersectionality – and all for good historical and contextual reason. Still, those whose 
primary identities/oppressions are defined by less-theorised marginalised categorical 
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realms6 may need to keep working hard to make their voices heard and to expand the 
often self-referentially narrow focus of intersectionality towards more globally inclusive – 
or diversely particular – paradigms.  
Further, mainstream disability scholarship and organising has itself frequently 
failed to account for non-paradigmatic (e.g., non-male, non-white, non-heterosexual, 
non-cis-gendered, and non-middle-or-upper-class) PWD; nor has it sufficiently 
acknowledged the sometimes antithetical interests of those relatively privileged PWD 
who, in setting the activist and scholarly agendas that purportedly represent all people 
with disabilities, have often thrown under the bus (so to speak) the ‘multiply 
marginalised’ on whose behalf intersectional methodologies were developed (e.g., see 
Ejiogu & Ware, 2008; Withers, 2012). Moreover, as disability philosopher Susan 
Wendell (1996) has pointed out, historically, the predictably-impaired, healthy disabled  
largely defined the priorities and goals of the disability movement.  Disability theorists 
today echo these observations and continue to demand that efforts towards rights, 
consciousness, and scholarship incorporate frequently omitted elements such as 
variable/’non-apparent’ impairments and more traditional ‘intersectional’ considerations 
(e.g., Orlando, 2012; Daley, Costa, & Ross, 2012).  
Importing the notion of intersectionality ‘wholesale’ to disciplines like CDS as a 
framework for inclusivity, especially without a deeper historical and socio-cultural 
examination of the theory’s roots, has its drawbacks. Many marginalised groups 
(including people with different kinds of impairments) have used ableist rationales to 
secure their own rights and recognitions (see Withers); hence, the authenticity of some 
                     
6
 For example: religion or nationality; shade or caste; unique/devalued embodiment, impairment, or health 
status; sub-cultural affiliation; and/or possibly even more individualised experiences of yet-
un(der)politicised subjective experience. 
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groups’ merely adding ‘disability’ to the list of categories (i.e., race, class, gender, sex, 
etc.) deemed intersectionally important, without further questioning or acknowledging 
their underlying values and biases, may be suspect. Likewise, attempts to ‘push’ 
disability into broader intersectional frameworks must avoid reifying the sexism, racism, 
heterosexism, cissexism, and classism associated with disability mobilising in the past, 
as well as other internal divides between various PWD. As Jasbir Puar (2011) warns, 
“like the language of diversity, the language of intersectionality, its very invocation, it 
seems, largely substitutes for intersectional analysis itself.” Nonetheless, the 
methodological approaches and philosophical discourses grounding intersectional 
theories can, employed conscientiously, act as one possible starting place for those 
motivated to develop more comprehensive disability-inclusive theories and 
communities. 
 
‘Intersecting’ Disability 
For disability to emerge from embodiment, then, it must be recognized. Even when a 
disability is seldom discernible or legible—such as psychiatric conditions or many 
illnesses—the potential for its emergence, especially spontaneous occurrences or 
revelations, makes disability as well. Sometimes disability claims us through our 
appearance and sometimes it claims us through our functioning. Someone with a 
chronic illness may not meet the temporal demands the workplace expects. Someone 
with a psychiatric disability may not meet the sociability expectations of interpersonal 
networks. Someone who has seizures, autistic spectrum disability, chronic illness, 
psychiatric diagnosis, or is hard of hearing may not be recognizably disabled always or 
even often, but they become disabled when that characteristic emerges in some 
perceptible way in the social environment.  (Rosemarie Garland-Thomson, 2014) 
 
In the present moment, ‘intersectionality’ is often understood as an almost generic 
demand to take into account otherwise-unconsidered ‘complex’ overlapping 
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oppressions and identities. 7 It can be invoked by anyone faced with a situation, 
pedagogical or practical, inadequately informed by some relevant multiply-marginalised 
perspective (e.g., assertions that certain remedies or laws would improve the lives of 
PWD, where in fact they would only benefit certain classes of PWD). The ‘intersectional 
intervention’ can be a well-considered response or ‘knee-jerk’ reaction (e.g., deploying 
the notion of intersectionality in classroom settings in efforts to call out what are 
perceived as under-qualified, over-essentialised claims). Puar (2011) cautions against 
language being invoked as a substitute for “intersectional analysis itself”; moreover, and 
despite not explicitly mentioning disability, her suggestion that “categories–race, gender, 
sexuality– are… events, actions, and encounters, between bodies, rather than simply 
entities and attributes of subjects” seems equally – even especially – applicable in the 
realm of dis/ability. Ideally, such an observation would remind us all to do our best to 
unpack and acknowledge our complicity in systems of oppression, even as we 
contemplate the actions and analyses we might undertake to challenge them. 
In line with these possibilities, I hereby invite us to move the ‘intersectionality 
conversation’ beyond the “conventional mantra of race, gender, sexuality and class” 
critiqued by Meekosha and Shuttleworth (2009, p. 62) towards one particular site of 
‘intracategorical’ (or, literally, ‘within-category’) ‘othering’: that of PWIVID – who, due to 
their impairments’ not being constant or immediately apparent8, do not fit the 
                     
7
 As an anonymous reviewer poignantly suggested, it is important to acknowledge here “the legacy of 
black feminist critical thought from which Kimberlé Crenshaw’s formulation of intersectionality arose (as 
well as some of the problems inherent in intersectionality’s cooptation by white feminists as a 
depoliticized means of managing complexity in research…”);  For example, see Alexander-Floyd, 2012; 
Carbin & Edenheim, 2013; Erevelles & Minear, 2010; and Gines, 2011 – whose articles illustrate this 
point. 
 
8
 I use the word ‘invisible’ here for simplicity and recognisability (and because its “I” vowel makes my 
proposed initialisms pronounceable as an acronym). Later in this paper, I re-visit objections to the notion 
INTERSECTIONALITY: A DISABLED FRAMEWORK?             64 
paradigmatic PWD mould of ‘people with obvious and stable impairment and disabilities’ 
(PWOSID)9. In discussing impairments and disabilities themselves, I henceforth refer to 
IVID (‘invisible and variable impairments and disabilities’) and OSID (‘obvious and 
stable impairments and disabilities’). 
 
The Categories Within: The Impairment-Disability Dichotomy 
Even if one wholeheartedly accepts the purist ‘social model’ wet dream of a perfect 
binary separation of ‘impairment’ from ‘disability’ (which, again, I do not), there is no 
such thing as a purely constructed ‘disability’ without some underlying ‘impairment.’ And 
there is no ‘impairment’ without some degree of, at minimum, physical difficulty. (Valéria 
M. Souza, February 3, 2014) 
 
According to Meekosha and Shuttleworth (p. 47), a discipline or field of study needs to 
“be aware of its own historicity and critically reflect on its conceptual framework” and “to 
engage in a dialogue with other cultures on the issues and concepts of current 
significance.” Along these lines, it has been noted that (Critical) Disability Studies has 
either failed to follow the lead of, or is lagging well behind, other interdisciplinary 
departments and movements (e.g., Feminist Studies; Trans/Gender Studies; Queer 
Studies; etc.) that have co-evolved as critical activist-scholar collaborations responding 
to their own marginalised constituencies (e.g., Souza, February 3, 2014). As an 
extension of (and garnering similar criticisms to) the mainstream disability activist 
movement, CDS has persisted for several decades in a ‘social model’ approach 
“premised on a binary split between ‘impairment’ (the underlying ‘physical specifics’ of 
                                                                  
of ‘invisibility’ used thus (e.g., as it removes the onus from the ‘viewer’ to see – or notice – evidence of 
impairment/disability that, while sometimes not obvious, may still be traceable for those who know 
how/where to track it). See Montgomery, 2001; Orlando, 2012. 
 
9
 I introduce ‘PWOSID’ to problematise the notion that, by default, PWD are assumed to have obvious 
and stable disabilities unless otherwise specified (e.g., with a term like PWIVID), akin to ‘cis-gender’ being 
an equally-weighted counterpart to trans* gender identities. Such terms call for further elaboration. 
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an individual’s embodiment) versus ‘disability’ (the socio-cultural, economic, and 
institutional oppression visited upon particular bodies as a result of prejudicial attitudes 
and beliefs regarding certain forms of embodiment)” – a binary “modeled after 
Feminism’s sex/gender binary” (Souza, 2014, February 3).  
Valéria Souza goes so far as to accuse Disability Studies scholars and activists 
of perpetuating (internalised) ableism. In their privileging those with stable, physical 
impairments over those with other, more marginalised disabling conditions, such as 
impairments medically labelled as (chronic) illness, these paradigmatic PWD 
representatives suppress and silence the images and voices of the “unhealthy 
disabled,” thus “revealing the extent to which they themselves have internalized 
mainstream ideas about what constitutes ‘good,’ ‘correct,’ and ‘normal’ bodies” (Souza). 
She goes on to propose that we treat impairment and disability (analogous to 
Butlerian sex and gender circa 1990) as “functionally synonymous and interchangeable 
terms” with neither being “understood as ‘purely physical’ nor ‘purely social’ (or cultural, 
or historical, etc.)” (Souza). In proposing to thus dissolve the “impairment/disability” 
dyad and the associated notion of “a pristine divide between ‘the biological’ and ‘the 
social,’” Souza clears a space for an impairment-inclusive disability category that she 
defines as “the situation produced when any individual exhibiting a ‘non-normative’ 
mode of embodiment enters into and interacts within a given social, cultural, linguistic, 
and historical context” (Souza). 
Less radically critical voices (i.e., those willing to challenge but nonetheless work 
within the framework of an acknowledged impairment/disability distinction) have 
similarly insisted that the CDS pendulum must swing back from an outmoded anti-
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impairment ‘social model’ approach to conceptualizing and politicising disability10. Liz 
Crow’s demand that we “BRING BACK IMPAIRMENT!” in order to remove the prevalent 
taboos around discussing the unpleasant realities of impaired/disabled embodiment is 
now famous (1996 – caps in original). Similarly, Tom Shakespeare publicly recanted his 
earlier social model stance, boldly asserting “we cannot ignore the role of impairment 
and the body in our lives… A social constructionist approach that loses contact with the 
physical does us no favours” (2000, p. 162).  
Shakespeare’s point that “reconciling the public and the private also means 
connecting the individual experience of the body, to the collective experience of social 
structures” (2000, p. 265) echoes the body-connected theorising that feminists, 
including disabled feminists (e.g., Morris, 1993; Wendell, 1989/1996; Erickson, 2007) 11, 
have done for decades, and continue to do. For example, Kafer (2013, p. 7) highlights: 
“the social model with its impairment/disability distinction erases the lived realities of 
impairment; in its well-intentioned focus on the disabling effects of society, it overlooks 
the often-disabling effects of our bodies.” 
Evidently, much work remains to be done before CDS can be recognised in this 
realm for fully employing “the critical self-reflexivity that is a hallmark of critical social 
theory” (Meekosha & Shuttleworth, p. 62) to a degree that justifies the “C” in its 
initialism: whether we opt to dismantle the impairment/disability binary or refocus our 
attention on its neglected left side. 
                     
10
 The ‘social model’ is itself a ‘backlash’ against a vilified ‘medical model’ “according to which ‘disability’  
(understood medically as synonymous with ‘impairment’) is portrayed as an individual problem that is 
both a.) undesirable and b.) needs to be ‘fixed’ or ‘cured’ through medical/institutional/scientific 
intervention” (Souza, 2014, February 3). 
 
11
 As Dr. Nancy Halifax refers to them: “the manymanymany women/feminists who never left 
bodytheorizing [sic]” (personal communication, November 24, 2014) 
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Intra-Categorical Intersectionality and PWD: Why bother distinguishing PWOSID 
from PWIVID? 
In the disability community, we speak as if some kinds of disability were visible, and 
others weren’t. Let me suggest a different approach: think about the ways different 
kinds of disability have become more familiar, and more visible, to you as you’ve gotten 
to know more disabled people. (Cal Montgomery, 2001) 
 
As noted above, the intersectionality framework has been applied for decades to the 
overlapping categories of race, gender, class, and sexuality, with disability, as a more 
recent addition, less fully incorporated into general intersectional awareness. In 
establishing PWIVID as a category of ‘marginalised intersectional identity’ that is, in 
itself, complex, I adopt a new approach to ‘intracategorical complexity’.12  
According to Leslie McCall (2005), the “intracategorical complexity” approach to 
intersectionality “takes marginalized intersectional identities as an analytic starting 
point...in order to reveal the complexity of lived experience within such groups.” She 
attributes the development of this approach to “feminists of color” who “steered a middle 
course” in seeking to complicate group boundaries and use them in a more critical way, 
without totally rejecting “the social reality of categorization” (McCall). By contrast to 
“anticategorical” (in which “fixed categories [are] simplifying social fictions that produce 
inequalities in the process of producing differences”) and “intercategorical” (requiring a 
provisional adoption of “existing analytical categories to document relationships of 
inequality among social groups and changing configurations of inequality along multiple 
and conflicting dimensions”) approaches, a within-category, or intra-categorical, 
                     
12
 Next logical steps would include investigating intersections between PWIVID and other categories of  
marginalisation (e.g., PWIVID who are female, transgender, racialised, working class or poor, multiply 
impaired/disabled, etc.); unfortunately, this analysis is outside the scope of the current paper. 
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approach is “critical of broad and sweeping acts of categorization” while complicating 
and using categories in a critical way (McCall, 2005).  
Such an approach seems well-suited to an exploration of PWIVID. In addition to 
any non-disability-related marginalities they may inhabit, PWIVID are doubly burdened 
by: 1) living with the disabling effects of impairments/disabilities and 2) failing to have 
the nature and/or effects of their disabling impairments/disabilities recognised by others. 
Because PWIVID – including those labelled as having ‘chronic illnesses’ and other 
variably impairing conditions, as well as those whose embodied situations are not fully 
or adequately comprehended by either lay people or the medical system – are not as 
well-represented in scholarship and activism by and for PWD, their voices are less 
heard than those of PWOSID. 
In her aptly-titled article “Invisible Disability,” N. Ann Davis (2005, p. 153) asserts 
that the examination of “the notion of invisible disability” is a worthwhile undertaking “in 
its own right.” She elaborates: 
There are many individuals with conditions, illnesses, and structural or 
biomechanical anomalies that are life limiting but not readily discernible to 
others. People who suffer from severe depression, chronic pain, or 
posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD); people who are violently allergic to 
common household chemicals; those who have a seizure disorder, chronic 
fatigue syndrome (CFS), or severe fibromyalgia; and those who have 
sustained a mild traumatic brain injury (MTBI) may all appear “normal” to 
people with whom they have casual interactions. Yet they may still be 
disabled: the quality of their lives may be no less profoundly or adversely 
impacted by these conditions than is the quality of life of those whose 
disabilities are more obvious… People whose disabilities are not generally 
perceived by others do not, for that reason alone, find it easier to minister to 
themselves or to engage productively and effectively in the world without 
having to endure pain, discomfort, and exhaustion. There is no reason to 
believe that the invisibility of a disability itself necessarily lessens its impact 
or makes the disability less serious. (Davis, 2005, pp. 153-154) 
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R. Janice Orlando’s (2012) thesis “Gimp Anthropology: Non-Apparent Disabilities 
and Navigating the Social” highlights the unique challenges faced by people with non-
apparent, physical disabilities, as compared to those more visibly disabled. Describing 
how the “absence of visible cues indicating physical impairment… leav[es] the sufferer 
vulnerable to moral judgments and social sanctions when they are unable to embody 
and perform to cultural norms” and “generates a closeted status that the individual must 
learn to navigate,” Orlando goes so far as to assert that such individuals inhabit “a third 
space of functioning between the outwardly ‘healthy’ and the visibly disabled” (2012, p. 
ii). As such, the experiences of PWIVID are painted as qualitatively distinct, and thus 
meriting their own discussions and analyses to, as McCall (2005) might say, “account 
for lived experience at neglected points of intersection [that] reflect multiple subordinate 
locations as opposed to dominant or mixed locations.” 
Issues of intracategorical nuance are often glossed over, even when the topic is 
broached. For example, Shildrick (2009, p. 82) writes of the necessity “to remind 
ourselves that disability takes many forms not all of which are written on the body,” 
elaborating that “it is all too easy to conflate what are variously called developmental or 
learning disabilities with physical disabilities, and although a similar analysis applied 
across categories may be productive, it may also obscure highly cogent differences.” 
Yet, in making a very valid point, Shildrick inadvertently reifies the notion that the 
degree to which one is physically impaired is ‘legible’ – to others – on one’s body; this 
assumption, no matter how erroneous, informs many PWIVID-specific experiences. 
Some stigmas and other challenges faced by PWIVID in relation to PWOSID are 
analogous to those faced by people who identify (or are identified) with the “B” 
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(bisexual) in the LGBTQ+ spectrum (Ford, 2015, March 14) or who are otherwise not 
‘legible’ as ‘queer’ (e.g., VanNewkirk, 2008). For example, one may not be recognised 
for one’s actual embodied/phenomenological experiences (e.g., sexual/romantic 
orientation) due to visual and behavioural markers belying underlying ‘membership 
criteria.’ Such erasure, along with other invalidations of their lived realities, can be 
experienced by the ‘invisibly-different’ in the presence of ‘in-group’ and ‘out-group’ 
members alike (e.g., in both ‘queer’ and ‘straight’ company – see Yoshino (2000) on 
non-binary orientations; VanNewkirk (2008) on “femme lesbian” identities).  
To illustrate how such intracategorical complexities can unfold across categories, 
consider the case of social events billed as queer women’s gatherings that explicitly 
exclude ‘heterosexual’ and ‘male-identified’ people. Such invitation parameters, set with 
the intention of fostering ‘queer women’s community,’ may speak to some of the female-
oriented ‘flirtation and affiliation needs’ of all queer women attending these events. 
Nonetheless, they more comprehensively address the holistic needs of the ‘mono-
sexual’ (or ‘lesbian’) attendees, who can invite their significant others and openly 
celebrate their relationships with (all of) them. Whereas, heterosexually-active 
bisexual/queer women may find themselves in the more socially awkward situation of 1) 
being prevented from having their male partners physically present and 2) feeling 
pressure to ‘closet’13 or hide their heterosexual relationships, and thus obscure their full 
sexual-relational identities, due to pervasive ‘biphobia’ in such contexts (C.S., personal 
communication, 2014). Evidently, questions of visibility and variability of identities affect 
                     
13
 Ellen Jean Samuels (2003) borrows from queer terminology in making this apt analogy in ‘My Body, My 
Closet: Invisible Disability and the Limits of Coming-Out Discourse’.  
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groups other than PWD and raise similar questions of legitimacy and belonging in those 
realms. 
Bringing the analogising back to a disability context, I call upon another 
politicised realm of sexuality: that of the (non-consensual) sexual objectification of 
women. It is undoubtedly true that many (able-bodied/presenting) women have 
experienced being overtly, non-consensually sexualised (and, relatedly, expected to 
reproduce) as oppressive; by contrast, many disabled women (with obvious disabilities) 
have fought against their equally non-consensual overt desexualisation (and, in some 
cases, involuntary sterilisation – a tragic history also shared with able-bodied racialized 
and poor white women14). The latter’s still-ongoing struggles for simple recognition as 
agential sexual adult beings (e.g., see Finger, 1992; Erickson, 2007) have not generally 
been reflected by able-bodied feminists who, basing their politics on their personal 
experiences (e.g., of receiving more sexual attention, in more contexts, than they 
desired), purport to speak for ‘all women.’ Feminist discourses that condemn the 
presumably violating ‘gaze’ fail to address the experiences of (disabled) (also feminist) 
women who desire more, not less, sexual attention and recognition15. Similarly, as Anne 
Finger writes: 
Because the initial focus of the women’s movement was set by women who 
were overwhelmingly non-disabled (as well as young, white, and middle-
class), the agenda of reproductive rights has tended to focus on the right to 
abortion as the central issue. Yet for disabled women, the right to bear and 
rear children is more at risk. (1992) 
 
                     
14
 See Davis, A. (1981). “Racism, birth control, and reproductive rights” in Women, Race, and Class, 202-
221. 
 
15
 This section inspired, in part, by personal communication with Susan Wendell in 2014, reflecting on 
course material covered in her 1999 ‘Women and Disability’ class. 
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A shift in topical focus towards our universal needs – to receive adequate 
welcomed, consensual sexual attention, as well as reproductive education and choices, 
and also to be able to avoid unwanted attention, advances, and pregnancies – could 
help bridge this gap without alienating disabled feminists. Ultimately, violations on either 
side may be more triggering for different individuals, based on whether they have been 
more frequently subjected to unwanted advances or deprived of sexual attention and 
options, but at very least, the need for sexual validation and choice is shared by all 
people. 
Similarly, non-inclusive and non-representative disability milieus and discourses 
that paint all PWD – PWOSID and PWIVID alike – with the same categorical brush, 
seeing PWOSID-specific issues as ‘all-PWD’ issues, are at risk of replicating and 
intensifying the invisibility and associated ‘closeted’ experiences of PWIVID in an ableist 
world. For example, most PWIVID have suffered through experiences (with strangers 
and intimates alike), in which they are expected to act as though they were perfectly 
able-bodied. If their appearances and/or disclosed diagnostic categories do not 
adequately justify their perceived ‘failures’ to perform, they may be judged as lazy, 
selfish, malingerers, drama queens, etc. (e.g., see McRuer & Mollow, 2012). Yet, it is far 
more common, both in CDS and in popular accounts representing ‘disabled 
perspectives,’ to hear about people who falsely assume that PWD with obvious markers 
of difference are incapable of acting or speaking on their own behalf. Meanwhile, few 
analogous discussions are publicly taken up by PWD regarding the effects on PWIVID 
of the common overestimations of their ‘abilities’ – or, as Eli Clare (1999, p. 67) might 
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put it, the degree to which PWIVID are assumed to be “enabled” whether or not they 
actually are.  
I recall here disabled feminist scholar Jenny Morris’ (1993, p. 56) expression of 
disappointment at how disability is “generally invisible in terms of feminism’s 
mainstream agenda.” She explains how she experienced this particular brand of ‘in-
group insensitivity’ differently from her usual disenchantment at ableist encounters 
elsewhere – as betrayal, rather than ignorance or indifference – due to its shattering of 
any “assumption that [we’re] ‘on the same side’“ (Morris, 1993, p. 56). As a CDS scholar 
(and human) with both ‘invisible’ and ‘variable’ impairments, I resonate with Morris’s 
observation. Her ‘insider’ sense of betrayal at the failure of mainstream feminism to 
speak to her personal experiences as a disabled woman recalls my own with CDS.  
I eagerly anticipate the day that we claim a space in the institution “where we’re 
ready to acknowledge that we might be [or have said something] wrong” (Piepmeier, 
Cantrell, & Maggio, 2014) and work towards rectifying identified issues (i.e., through 
explicit incorporations of yet underrepresented topics and voices, and making 
appropriate amends). Only once we have acknowledged our differences, as well as our 
shared experiences and goals, can CDS and ‘disability communities’ truly purport to 
speak both critically and productively – with, and on behalf of, all PWD. 
 
The Questionable ‘Privilege’ of ‘Passing’: ‘Trace-ing’ the Invisible Double-Edge 
I try to push boundaries… because I believe that this shaming silence… is why we don’t 
know how to respect one another’s bodies and one another’s boundaries. It is why we 
don’t know what consent can look like… [T]he more and more we talk about that which 
we have such a hard time talking about, then we will all feel a little less ashamed and 
we will all be a little more open to new possibilities and new kinds of pleasure… And 
beauty will become something more than being able-bodied, young and white. And 
sexual autonomy and expression will be something that we will all have the right to. And 
consent will evolve into something that we will all be versed in practicing. It is on 
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account of these hopes that I talk about sex all of the time. Loudly. On principle. 
(Kaleigh Trace, 2014, pp. 6-7) 
 
In Hot, Wet, and Shaking: How I Learned to Talk About Sex, self-identified queer 
disabled author and sex educator Kaleigh Trace (2014) writes: 
“Disabled” is such a broad identifier, and having a disability can look so many 
different ways. If you see me sitting or in photographs you would not 
necessarily know it. Until you see me walk, you would probably not guess it. 
All of this means that I pass. I am sometimes assumed to be nondisabled. 
Riding my trike makes me more visibly disabled. When I am on my trike, I get 
the most commentary. When I am on “training wheels,” people take full liberty 
to yell at me, tease me, and ask me what’s wrong with me. When I let those 
comments go, left unnoticed, I am allowing them to proliferate. People with 
different disabilities than mine may experience this kind of verbal harassment 
more regularly than I do. And so because of my relative position of privilege, I 
want to make sure I am always using my voice. Having a voice is a right that 
so many of us are systemically denied access to. I want to make sure I use 
mine when I can. (pp. 65-66) 
 
Trace’s spinal cord injury – the result of a childhood car crash – led to her current 
“wobbly two-step [that] gets [her] to all of the places that [she] need[s] to go” (p. 3). 
Visibility, with regard to both disability and sexuality, is a dominant theme running – or, 
perhaps, two-stepping – through Trace’s mostly16-autobiographical narrative. One way 
to frame being read incorrectly as both able-bodied and heterosexual, as Trace notes, is 
as “privilege” (p. 66): insofar as such ‘passing’ enables avoidance of the stigma and 
abuse that result when non-normative embodiments or orientations are readily 
visible/legible to others.  
Trace takes up of the ‘privilege of passing’ within an anti-oppressive framework 
that calls upon her “to make sure [she is] always using [her] voice” because “[h]aving a 
                     
16
 In Trace’s own words (2014, p. 127): “The version of me that I have written here is not all true. I am a 
shameless exaggerator, always have been. Here I wrote someone whom I sometimes am and whom I 
hope to be more often. I wrote a version of me who is not afraid to be unapologetically earnest. I wrote a 
version of me who throws herself into vulnerability with seeming abandon. I wrote a version of me who 
fucks and fights and loves. I wrote this version of me because to do so matters – sex-positive narratives 
of disability are needed.” 
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voice is a right that so many of us are systemically denied access to” (p. 66). Within 
such a framework, both ‘privilege’ and ‘passing’ are almost dirty words; tinged with a 
sense of ‘traitorship’ at unmerited access to social, financial, educational, health, or 
sexual opportunities due to factors based upon which one is situated – or is perceived 
as being situated – higher than others within an imagined socio-cultural/economic 
pyramid.   
However, I suggest here that there is a seldom-acknowledged ‘shadow side’ to 
what some might refer to as the ‘privilege of passing as able-bodied’; it begins with 
denial and erasure alluded to above, based upon which PWIVID might empathise with 
the experiences of people with non-mono-sexual orientations and identities (e.g., see 
Yoshino, 2000). For example, despite sometimes being mistaken as being able-bodied, 
Trace otherwise writes self-assuredly about her embodied experience as a PWOSID 
whose disability ‘status’ would be difficult for anyone to challenge: 
Having this beautiful, disabled body and living in this world with such an 
obvious difference has shaped me irreversibly. Being disabled informs every 
single experience I have with every person, every street corner, every 
building and every set of stairs. I am, and have always been, constantly 
reminded that my body is different from “normal” bodies, that it is actually 
physically impossible for me to conform to hegemonic standards of being. 
(2014, p. 3) 
 
In contrast to PWOSID – whose “obvious difference,” as Trace phrases it, calls 
attention to their impairments/disabilities – many PWIVID are not “constantly reminded” 
by others that their bodies are different from “normal” bodies; for them, such reminders 
of their IVID, and the challenges they pose, come most frequently from within (with 
others either ignoring or doubting their nature and/or existence). Granted, except in 
situations where their impairments cause them to act in socially unacceptable ways that 
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elicit negative responses, PWIVID often benefit – to whatever degree that the absence 
of bullying or abuse can be seen as a benefit – from how strangers do not often take 
“full liberty to yell at” them, tease them, or ask them what’s wrong with them on the 
street, as Trace describes happening to her whenever she rides her bike with “training 
wheels” (p. 65).  
However, a lack of ‘superficial’ ableist stigma (and evasion of the accompanying 
verbal harassment and other forms of bullying and exclusionary practices that it brings) 
can go hand in hand with a lack of deeper recognition from otherwise-compassionate 
people. It is also, indeed, “actually physically impossible” for PWIVID “to conform to 
hegemonic standards of being” (Trace, 2014, p. 3); yet this fact is seldom externally 
validated or accommodated without considerable explanation on the part of PWIVID 
themselves (and/or their intimate allies). PWIVID’s experience of being disabled may 
still inform their every experience “with every person, every street corner, every building 
and every set of stairs” (Trace, p. 3) – but in such a way that the effects of their 
impairments are less frequently ‘seen’ by others and therefore more frequently 
challenged or ignored from a place of blanket denial of their equally real – if less 
obvious – differences.  
The empirical method upon which modern medicine and related sciences are (in 
theory) based requires, on the most basic level, visual (or otherwise “objectively 
testable”) validation. Much to the detriment of PWIVID, if their embodied situation can’t 
be seen with the naked eye (especially in the absence of a medical authority’s offering a 
translatable, justification-worthy narrative), it is sometimes assumed not to ‘really’ exist. 
In terms of how this authority shapes what we ‘see,’ Susan Wendell has elaborated: 
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[S]ome of the consequences of the cognitive and social authority of scientific 
Western medicine to describe our bodies in the societies where it holds 
sway… affects how we experience our bodies, contributing its objectifying 
perspective to the alienation already fostered by other aspects of commercial 
cultures. It affects how a society describes our experiences and validates or 
invalidates them, adding the burden of epistemic invalidation to many 
people’s experiences of illness and disability. It also affects how a society 
supports or fails to support our bodily suffering and struggles, for people who 
are ill or disabled without a medical diagnosis are not eligible for social 
programmes and are frequently abandoned by friends and family. (1996, p. 
9) 
 
In this respect, it might be argued that – in some cases – by virtue of the very 
‘obviousness’ of their impaired/disabled states, PWOSID are at an advantage, or in a 
relatively ‘privileged’ position, compared to those with IVID; specifically in contexts 
where others’ recognition of one’s impairment/disability status can confer benefits 
(social, financial, medical, or otherwise). In other words, while OSID’s unambiguous 
markers of ‘actual differences’ can bring about deleterious consequences, they also 
give credence to PWOSID’s phenomenological experiences and biological realities: a 
credence often withheld from PWIVID for their lack of such obvious and stable markers, 
without which the consequences can also be (if differently) dire. 
 
Does Your IVID Make You Livid? The Importance of Recognising (Invisible) 
Experiences of Impairment 
 
Sometimes we may feel, and be, very disabled; sometimes quite the opposite… If I’m 
having a ‘good’ day, or if my problems are invisible, then people with a very visible 
disability or a benefits assessment officer may think I’m a fraud if I claim to be a 
disabled person. However, on a ‘bad’ day I’d be disbelieved if I claimed to be anything 
but! …Would that we were all regarded as being in one camp, a camp of human beings, 
but back to reality… [L]et us… educate society into understanding that there are such 
things as ‘invisible disability’, ‘partial disability’, ‘intermittent disability’, ‘variable 
disability’, ‘fluctuating disability’. (Jill Holroyd, 2009) 
 
According to the Invisible Disabilities Association, ‘invisible’ (or, alternately, non-
apparent or hidden or unrecognised) disabilities encompass “mild to severe debilitating 
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conditions” that can include “fatigue, cognitive dysfunctions, mental disorders or pain” 
(IDA, 2014). ‘Variable’ (or partial or intermittent or fluctuating – see Holroyd, 2009) 
impairments can range along the axis from ‘obvious’ to ‘non-apparent’; these are 
characterised by their instability and their ‘symptoms’ may vary (or fluctuate) in 
presence, intensity, and/or severity over time. Within the traditional ‘impairment-
disability’ binary17, it is relevant to note a) that not all impairments are always disabling 
and b) that both impairments and disabilities can be distinctly apparent or recognised; 
stable or intermittent; static or variable/fluctuating.  
Some experiences of embodiment and dis/ability are almost inherently ‘invisible’ 
in that they take considerable effort to be ‘seen’ by, or made legible to, most other 
people, most of the time (e.g., the ‘work’ done by people with allergies and chemical 
sensitivities to avoid, if they are successful in doing so, a reaction; the less obvious life-
altering effects of the conditions diagnosed as Crohn’s or IBS, ME or Chronic Fatigue 
Syndrome, fibromyalgia, Marfan’s, Ehlers Danlos Syndrome; etc.). Others are rendered 
‘invisible’ only through considerable individual effort (e.g., a practiced smile to cover a 
pain-induced wince; a summoning of adrenaline reserves to get through a work day 
‘normally’ rather than let oneself rest or collapse in fatigue; etc.) and social engineering 
(e.g., overt policies and less tangible social mores that discourage discussions and/or 
other revelations of one’s failures to live up to embodied ideals – resulting, for example, 
in people calling in sick rather than showing up for work at less-than-optimal productivity 
levels). In essence, we are generally expected at least to downplay, if not hide, any 
evidence of ‘symptoms’; by design, norm structures keep lived experiences of 
                     
17
 Although, as noted above, this binary is conceptually contestable and has been dismissed by some 
(e.g., Souza, February 3, 2014) as an artificially dichotomous ‘common sense’ framework, I draw on it 
here as a shared semantic reference point. 
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‘abnormal’ embodiments out of the ‘common’ consciousness. 
Although all PWD are prone to being blamed for their unfortunate fate or karma, 
as noted above, those whose impairments are least easily recognised and assimilated 
into common understandings of ‘disability’ categorisation are susceptible to a particular 
brand of exclusionary judgment. “The habit most of us have of blaming the victim, by 
wondering or overtly asking ‘Are you really doing enough to change your situation?’” is 
widespread (Kaufman, Silverberg, & Odette, 2003, pp. 6-7).  PWIVID are often 
themselves relegated to – or forced to hide their struggles within – the ‘private sphere’ 
(Wendell, 1996, p. 40) or ‘closet’ (Samuels, 2003). While PWOSID may be subject to 
similar pressures, those who are able to ‘come out’ – and are supported in doing so – 
can make access demands based on the visible stability of their OSID not as easily 
granted those with IVID. Instead of being invited into a sense of solidarity with other 
PWD, PWIVID – who alternately ‘pass’ or ‘are passed’18 as non-disabled – inhabit an 
especially vulnerable realm of non-belonging.  
Outsiders amongst both the able-bodied and the proud PWOSID, PWIVID may 
feel inferior to the former (e.g., when the productivity by which they are comparatively 
judged is limited by their IVID) and yet insufficiently entitled to make the same kinds of 
claims for support as the latter (due to internalised notions that ‘real’ disability looks like 
OSID). Regardless, they cannot help but be at the mercy of what Kafer (2013, p. 7) calls 
“the often-disabling effects of our bodies.” When impairments and related struggles go 
unrecognised, “[s]hame and guilt can arise at any time. Shame for being a social pariah, 
                     
18
 It is in the context of racialisation and sexual orientation, rather than disability, that Ralina Joseph 
(2012, p. 59) explicitly makes use of the phrase “passing versus being passed.” Similarly, Rachel Gorman 
– without using the exact term ‘being passed’ – discusses (p. 5) and politicises (p. 8) Sara Ahmed’s 
notion of ‘passing’ in her 2011 article “‘Obama’s my dad’: Mixed race suspects, political anxiety and the 
new imperialism.”  
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and guilt that a loved one has to defend you to others because of it” (Orlando, 2012, p. 
63) – or simply for not living up to one’s own and others’ unachievable expectations. In 
addition, “denial of their experience is a major source of loneliness, alienation, and 
despair in people with unrecognized disabilities” (Jeffreys, 1982, paraphrased in 
Wendell, p. 25). 
 
(In)Conclusions: Why didn’t the invisibly disabled chickens cross the road?  
(They got stuck in the intersection.) 
 
My reflections as a disabled/non-disabled activist/ researcher helped in my realisation 
that to be an ‘insider’, to ‘fit in’, extends beyond any fixed category and is about the 
shared experience of oppression. (Karen Beauchamp-Pryor, 2011, p. 15) 
 
In their recent exploration of sex worker empowerment and solidarity, Avenatti and 
Jones (2015, p. 91) concluded, in reference to an article by Schwartz, Meisenhelder, 
Ma, and Reed (2003), that “individuals who engage in political organising around their 
identity group report higher levels of happiness, pride, and greater feelings of safety.” 
Yet the road to empowerment and solidarity for PWD of all stripes is littered with many 
obstacles and barriers (e.g., see Beauchamp-Pryor’s 2011 examination of the politics 
around individual’s choices to pursue “cures” for their impairing conditions). Offering 
another viewpoint, Francisco Ortega (2009, p. 427) has commented that “the search for 
new and non-pathologized forms of identity and community stands in tension with 
reductionistic identity politics.” In his discussion of autistic identity, he critiques the 
“aggressive identity politics advanced by the radical activists of the autistic movement, 
who appropriate the right to speak in the name of every person diagnosed with autism” 
and “obliterate difference within the autistic movement.”  
Even as I challenge the homogeneous hegemonic PWOSID-centric image of 
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those depicted as ‘rightfully belonging’ in the PWD category, I feel concerned by the 
myriad interests and conflicts of interest at play. I do not wish to similarly subsume all 
PWIVID into yet another category that merely re-effaces the still-complex 
‘intracategorical heterogeneity’ within it; nor do I want to advocate a scenario under 
which some speak on behalf of others whose stances and/or best interests they do not 
truly represent. 
As noted throughout this paper, certain kinds of impairments/disabilities – 
namely, those that are visible or obvious (versus invisible or non-apparent) and 
stable/predictably progressive or constant (versus variable or intermittent) – are more 
easily taken into account by others; such recognition is an important factor informing 
whether one’s body (or self) is legible19 as impaired/disabled. Yet, engaging in 
conversations that name the relevant issues becomes difficult for a number of reasons, 
including that, on a socio-linguistic level, the very concept of ‘invisible disability’ is 
identified as problematic20 by some (e.g., Montgomery, 2001; Orlando, 2012) and 
embraced by others (e.g., Davis, 2005). Indeed, the word ‘invisible’ may remove some 
onus from a ‘perceiver’ to notice disability, linguistically rendering ‘invisibility’ an inherent 
attribute of a disability (and/or impairment) itself; yet, ‘invisibility’ is, in its most literal 
sense, a direct reflection of many people’s lived experiences of IVID (their own and 
others’). That the term ‘invisible’ makes ‘looking’ the dominant mode of taking in 
information may, semantically, erase other equally valid kinds of non-sight-based 
                     
19
 Here, I borrow from Ralina Joseph’s (2012, p. 60) usage of “the visible versus invisible or legible versus 
illegible” in the context of racialisation and sexual orientation, rather than disability – highlighting the easy, 
if sometimes imperfectly analogous, transferability of concepts between disciplines. 
 
20
 E.g., see Janice Orlando’s (2012) preface for a primer on some issues leading to her choice of the term 
‘non-apparent’ and Cal Montgomery’s (2001) insistence that “a distinction between visible and invisible 
disability is [neither] useful [n]or even meaningful.” 
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knowing (e.g., the perceptions of people with visual impairments). Nonetheless, few 
would contest that PWD’s experiences differ depending on the degree to which those 
around them notice, and are appropriately responsive to and supportive of, their 
impairments/disabilities and related needs; and sight is, every-increasingly, the 
dominant mode through which most people make at least initial appraisals of embodied 
situations and capacities. Evidently, further research, writing, and dialogue will be 
required in order in order to untangle how comprehensions of PWIVID might be taken 
up within discourses informed by ‘intracategorical’ intersectionality, as well as other 
theoretical and methodological frameworks.    
As a relatively new interdisciplinary academic field, CDS now has the opportunity 
– and, arguably, the responsibility – to remedy its historic lapses. Will we take the lead 
from other anti-oppressive movements and disciplines that have been accused of 
perpetuating oppressions internally and responded accordingly21? Can we work 
together to rectify the biases and omissions that we, as researchers, teachers, and 
advocates, have been propagating (and/or be honest about our past and current 
weaknesses in these realms)?  In other words, can CDS – which inevitably absorbs at 
least some of the ableist biases of a ‘dominant culture’ hostile to the challenges of living 
with all impairments/disabilities, including IVID – “be institutionalized, recognize 
ourselves and be recognized as a discipline, and still be agents of social change” 
(Piepmeier, Cantrell, & Maggio, 2014)? 
                     
21
 E.g., Women’s and Gender Studies programs (and feminist discourses) have, over time, acknowledged 
and responded to legitimate accusations of their own embedded racism, classism, ableism, and 
transphobia by altering previous stances and practices to better reflect and accommodate the needs and 
perspectives of marginalised constituencies, consciously incorporating them into their core teachings. 
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In asking these questions, I am aware of my standpoint as a PWIVID; I cannot 
deny my vested interest, nor offer any pretense of capacity to distinguish objectively 
between advocacy and self-advocacy. Many within the CDS field, routinely 
acknowledge and discuss the kinds of impairments and disabilities that might be 
classified as IVID; and yet, as far as I am aware, there exist no courses that explicitly 
prioritise PWIVID-centric topics22 and related subject matter23.  For now, I hope that by 
identifying and interrogating these topics, we can begin some important conversations 
that bring us closer together; and towards the places and spaces where, in the words of 
Kaleigh Trace (p. 7), “we will all feel a little less ashamed and we will all be a little more 
open to new possibilities.”  
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